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EXPERT TESTIMONY DISCLOSURE
UNDER FEDERAL RULE 26:
A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
KEITH H. BEYLER*

INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires each party to
disclose the identity of its expert witnesses and to provide written
reports prepared by some of those experts.' This Article proposes
an amendment that extends the written report requirement to all
employee experts and party experts, and requires opinion
disclosure for independent experts.
Part I compares Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26's
disclosure and discovery procedure with state court expert witness
information exchange procedures. Part II reviews federal court
decisions about the written report requirement's coverage of
employee experts, party experts, and independent experts. Part
III then explains why the proposed changes should be made. The
Appendix contains the proposed amendment.
I.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE

26

Federal Rule 26 was amended in 1970 to permit discovery of
the facts and opinions that expert witnesses acquire or develop in
anticipation of litigation or for trial.2 The 1970 Amendment
overcame privilege and work product objections to expert witness
discovery.'
Under the Amendment's two-step expert witness
discovery procedure,4 a party first served a standard interrogatory

* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law.

Anne

Oitzinger researched the state expert witness exchange procedures discussed
in Part I.B.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
3. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26, advisory committee's note (discussing subdivision
(b)(4)(A) of the 1970 Amendment).
4. This two-step expert witness discovery procedure did not apply to
expert witnesses who acquired or developed facts and opinions for non-
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that essentially asked another party to identify its expert
witnesses and to state the substance of their expected testimony.'
With court permission, a party then could depose the experts and
take other expert witness discovery!
Federal Rule 26 was further amended in 1993 to substitute
expert testimony disclosure for some expert witness discovery.
Part A reviews the current expert testimony disclosure and expert
witness discovery procedure. Part B then compares that procedure
with state court expert witness information exchange procedures.
A. FederalRule 26"s Disclosure-DiscoveryProcedure
Since 1993, Federal Rule 26 has required each party to make
a series of disclosures to other parties - an initial disclosure, an
expert testimony disclosure, and a pretrial disclosure.8 Having
each party disclose information automatically, rather than wait for
another party to make discovery requests, accelerates the
exchange of information and eliminates the paperwork involved in
making the discovery requests. 9
As part of the required expert testimony disclosure, each
party must identify all of its expert witnesses."° In addition, each
party must provide a written report prepared by any expert who is
either a retained expert witness (a person "retained ... to provide
expert testimony in the case") or the equivalent of a retained
expert witness (a person "specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party
regularly involve giving expert testimony"). 1 The expert's report
must contain a complete statement of all opinions the expert will
express, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the data or other
information the expert considered, and any exhibits the expert will
use to summarize or support the opinions. 2 The report also must

litigation purposes, such as an expert witness who was an "actor or viewer
with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter
of the lawsuit." Id. A discovering party treated the actor or viewer expert as
an ordinary witness for discovery purposes. Id.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)-(3).
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, advisory committee's note (discussing subdivision
(a) of the 1993 Amendment).
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A) (requiring identification of all witnesses
who testify under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence - the
rules applicable to expert testimony).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
12. Id.
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reveal the expert's qualifications, compensation, and prior
testimony. 13
This written report requirement demands more detailed
information than typically was elicited by the 1970 Amendment's
standard expert witness interrogatory. In the judgment of the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
answer to the 1970 Amendment's interrogatory "was frequently so
sketchy and vague that it rarely dispensed with the need to depose
the expert and often was even of little help in preparing for a
deposition of the witness." 4 Therefore, the Advisory Committee
designed the written report requirement to yield "a detailed and
complete [statement ofl the testimony the witness is expected to
present during direct examination. " 5
The written report requirement meshes with expert witness
discovery in the following way: the deposition of any expert
witness can be taken as a matter of right, but the deposition of an
expert who is covered by the written report requirement must
await the expert's report. 6 This deposition-timing requirement is
designed to make expert witness deposition-taking more efficient."
The duty to disclose expert testimony continues after the
expert is deposed. If a party later learns of a material omission or
error in its expert's written report or its expert's deposition
testimony, the party must apprise the other parties of the addition
or correction through a supplemental disclosure." The part of this
supplemental disclosure requirement that covers deposition
testimony applies uniquely to experts who are covered by the
written report requirement - i.e., a party ordinarily has no duty to
supplement its other witnesses' deposition testimony. 9 If a party

13. Id.
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note (analyzing subdivision
(a)(2)(B) of the 1993 Amendment).
15. Id.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note (exploring subdivision
(b) of the 1993 Amendment and acknowledging that "the information explosion
of recent decades has greatly increased both the potential cost of wide-ranging
discovery and the potential for discovery to be used as an instrument of delay
or oppression").
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). A party does not have to supplement, however,
if the information already has been made known to other parties during

discovery or in writing. Id.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1)-(2).

The Advisory Committee has said the

following about the duty to supplement under Federal Rule 26(e):
[T]he obligation to supplement responses to formal discovery requests
applies to interrogatories, requests for production and requests for
admissions, but not ordinarily to deposition testimony. However, with
respect to experts from whom a written report is required under
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fails to supplement its expert's written report or its expert's
deposition testimony, the party generally cannot elicit the
undisclosed information from the expert at trial.2 °
Because the written report requirement covers only retained
expert witnesses and experts equivalent to retained expert
witnesses,2 1 parties do not provide written reports for most
employee experts, party experts, and independent experts. 22 These
non-retained expert witnesses are identified in the expert
testimony disclosure, but the disclosure reveals nothing else about
them. 2 A party obtains more information about another party's
non-retained expert witnesses by taking expert witness
discovery. 24

Expert witness discovery might include serving a nonretained expert witness interrogatory. For example, the following
six-part interrogatory asks for the same six types of information
that must be contained in written reports prepared by retained
expert witnesses:
For each person identified in your expert testimony disclosure who
is not covered by Federal Rule 26's written report requirement, set
forth: (1) a complete statement of all opinions the expert will express
and the basis and reasons for these opinions; (2) the data or other
information the expert considered in forming the opinions; (3) any
exhibits the expert will use to summarize or support the opinions;
(4) the expert's qualifications, including a list of the expert's
publications in the past ten years; (5) the expert's compensation for
the study and testimony; and (6) a list of cases in which the expert

subdivision (a)(2)(B), changes in the opinions expressed by the expert
whether in the report or at a subsequent deposition are subject to a duty
of supplemental disclosure under subdivision (e)(1).
FED. R. CIrv. P. 26, advisory committee's note (highlighting subdivision (e) of
the 1993 Amendment) (emphasis added).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The party can elicit the undisclosed expert
testimony only if the failure to supplement was substantially justified or
harmless. Id.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
22. See infra Part II.A-C.
The term "non-retained expert
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A)-(B).
witnesses" is used in this article to refer collectively to all expert witnesses
who are not covered by the written report requirement - i.e., who are neither
retained expert witnesses nor the equivalents of retained expert witnesses.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A) gives a party the right to depose any person
who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.
A party also can serve interrogatories and use other appropriate discovery
tools. Rogers v. Detroit Edison Co., 328 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 n.3 (E.D. Mich.
2004).
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has given expert testimony at trial or by deposition in the past four
25
years.
This six-part interrogatory might be improper. Answering
the interrogatory seems equivalent to providing written reports,
and parties do not have to provide written reports for non-retained
expert witnesses.
Yet, the Advisory Committee never said
whether, or to what extent, a party can get information about
another party's non-retained expert witnesses through an
interrogatory.26 Capitalizing on the Committee's silence about the
proper way to get this type of information, the parties could make
the following arguments for and against a protective order
quashing the above interrogatory. 27
For: The Advisory Committee rightly judged that parties should not
have to incur the high cost of preparing written reports that preview
the trial testimony of their non-retained expert witnesses. While
retained expert witnesses and equivalent experts are "professional"
witnesses who can be hard to pin down at a deposition without
having a written report, non-retained expert witnesses are
"amateur" witnesses who are relatively easy to pin down. When an
interrogatory calls for the same information contained in written
reports, the cost of preparing the answer is essentially the same as
the cost of preparing the written reports. To honor the Committee's
judgment that this cost is unjustified for non-retained expert
witnesses, the interrogatory must be quashed.
Against: The Advisory Committee instead made a judgment about
witness control. Without control over an expert witness, a party
cannot require the expert to prepare a written report, and therefore
the party cannot be expected to provide the report. Unlike retained
expert witnesses and equivalent experts, non-retained expert
witnesses such as treating physicians are not controlled by the
parties. Answering the above interrogatory does not require witness
control, however, because a responding party prepares an
interrogatory answer based on available information.28 Therefore,
the interrogatory honors the Committee's judgment that the way to
get information about non-retained expert witnesses cannot depend
on witness control.

25. A responding party must supplement interrogatory answers to the same
extent as required disclosures. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)-(2). Accordingly, this
hypothetical interrogatory automatically calls for additions and corrections
just like the additions and corrections that are required for written reports.
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note (discussing
subdivision (a) of the 1993 Amendment).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(3) (stating that a protective order may be
issued to ensure that discovery is obtained in a method besides the one
selected by the party seeking discovery).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
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For: The argument against quashing the interrogatory is flawed.
While parties may lack control over independent experts such as
treating physicians, the non-retained expert witness category also
includes employee experts and party experts. Because the parties
have control over these employee experts and party experts, the only
possible reason for not requiring a party to provide a written report
for these experts is that the cost is unjustified. The Advisory
Committee probably thought this cost is unjustified for independent
experts, too.2
Against: Federal Rule 26 bases cost justification decisions on the
needs of each case, the amount in controversy, the parties'
resources, the importance of the issues at stake, and the importance
30
The
of the proposed discovery in resolving these issues.
interrogatory asks for information that is needed to depose nonretained expert witnesses efficiently. The interrogatory should be
quashed only in the unusual case where this need is outweighed by
the other cost justification factors.32
The above back-and-forth arguments reveal the following
problem. Because Federal Rule 26 does not contain a standard
interrogatory about non-retained expert witnesses, parties do not
know for sure how much information a non-retained expert
witness interrogatory can properly request. Parties know only
that, like all discovery requests, this type of interrogatory must be
"not unreasonable. 2
A district court can head off most arguments about what is
reasonable by requiring a standard exchange of non-retained
Federal Rule 26 states that the
expert witness information.
retained expert witnesses and
covers
requirement
written report
. . . directed by the
otherwise
as
"[elxcept
experts
equivalent
court." 33 In its discussion of how Federal Rule 26 applies to
treating physicians, the Advisory Committee indicated that this
power to "otherwise direct" includes the power to require written
The Committee first
reports for non-retained expert witnesses.'
terms
does not require a
by
its
26
Rule
that
Federal
explained

29. See Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. American Eurocopter LLC, 227 F.R.D.
421, 425 n.4 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (the rule makers probably thought the report
obligation would be "too onerous" for a participant witness such as a treating
physician).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
31. One federal district court has expressed general approval of
interrogatories that require "the same level of opinion disclosures as are
contemplated by Rule 26(a)(2)." Duluth Lighthouse for the Blind v. C.G.
Bretting Mfg. Co., 199 F.R.D. 320, 326 n.8 (D. Minn. 2000)
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2)(C).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note.
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party to provide a written report for a treating physician who is
testifying as an expert witness.35 The Committee then added: "By
local rule [or] order . . . the requirement of a written report may

35. See id. (commenting on paragraph (a)(2)(B) of the 1993 Amendment and
stating that "A treating physician . . . can be . . . called to testify at trial
without any requirement for a written report."). These words did not address
Federal Rule 26's expert witness identification requirement. In treating a
patient, a physician generally derives medical facts and medical opinions from
a combination of personal observation and medical knowledge. Because of the
personal observation component, some courts thought a treating physician
gives lay testimony under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, making
it unnecessary under Federal Rule 26 for the party eliciting such testimony to
identify the physician as an expert witness. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d
1116, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that "A treating physician is not
considered an expert witness if he or she testifies about observations based on
personal knowledge, including the treatment of the party."); see also
Richardson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 17 F.3d 213, 218 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that "a doctor is not an 'expert' if his or her testimony is based on...
observations during the course of treating . . . and personal knowledge");
Tzoumis v. Tempel Steel Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 871, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (stating
that "[a] treating physician that has not been previously disclosed as an expert
may still testify regarding his observations made during the course of
treatment and on matters of personal knowledge"); Rebolledo v. Herr-Voss
Corp., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (permitting the treating
physician to testify without first being disclosed as an expert). Because of the
medical knowledge component, however, other courts thought a treating
physician gives expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, making it necessary under Federal Rule 26 for the party eliciting
such testimony to identify the physician as an expert witness. See Zarecki v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1566, 1572-73 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(concluding that a treating physician had to be identified as an expert witness
in order to testify about the cause of the plaintiffs carpel tunnel syndrome);
see also Pedigo v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 145 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir.
1998) (confirming that a pathologist had to be identified as an expert witness
in order to testify about entry and exit wounds).
In 2000, Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended to
clarify the difference between lay testimony and expert testimony. Under
amended Rule 701, only an expert witness can state opinions and inferences
"based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope
of Rule 702." FED. R. EVID. 701. This amendment was designed partly to
prevent evasion of the expert testimony disclosure requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note
(discussing the 2000 Amendment). Since the 2000 Amendment took effect,
courts generally have required a party to identify a treating physician as an
expert witness. Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 875,
882-83 (5th Cir. 2004); Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 756-58
(7th Cir. 2004); Rogers v. Detroit Edison Co., 328 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689-90
(E.D. Mich. 2004); Brandon v. Vill. of Maywood, 179 F. Supp. 2d 847, 858-59
(N.D. Ill. 2001). But see Hawkins v. Graceland, 210 F.R.D. 210, 211 (W.D.
Tenn. 2002) (stating that "the law is not settled on whether a treating
physician who might testify on causation is to be considered an 'expert' for
purposes of Rule 26(a)(2)(A).").
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be.. . imposed upon additional persons who will provide [expert]
opinions."3"
A few district courts have adopted this type of local rule or
scheduling order. In two districts, a local rule requires disclosure
of "the facts known and opinions held by the treating physician(s)
and a summary of the grounds therefor."37 In a third district, a
similar local rule requires disclosure of "the substance" of the
expert evidence to be given by "hybrid fact/expert witnesses such
as treating physicians. " " In at least two additional districts, a
district judge's standard scheduling order extends the written
The standard
report requirement to treating physicians."'
exchanges of expert witness information in these seven districts
are more comprehensive than the exchange specified in Federal
Rule 26.
B. State Court Procedures
Forty-nine states have adopted procedures for exchanging
expert witness information.4 ° All of these states provide for expert
witness discovery, and some of the states follow the federal model
of substituting expert testimony disclosure for some expert witness
discovery. Table I divides the states into four categories according
to the procedure used in each state to exchange expert witness
information.

36. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note; see also Applera Corp. v.
MJ Research, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 13, 18 (D. Conn. 2004) (interpreting the
exception, in light of the Advisory Committee's note, to permit a scheduling
order that requires written reports for all expert witnesses).
37. N. & S.D. MIss. LOCAL R. 26.1(2)(d). This local rule does not fully
extend the written report requirement to treating physicians, because it
requires only some of the information required in a written report, and it does
not require the treating physician to prepare and sign the disclosure. Id.
38. E.D. Wis. Civ. LOCAL R. 26.1(a).
39. See Benoit v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. Civ. A. 01-674, 2001 WL
1524510, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2001) (requiring a treating physician to
submit a written report before his deposition); Mendez v. UNUM Life Ins. Co.
of America, No. 04-01312 JW, 2005 WL 1865426, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2005)
(requiring the treating physician to submit a written report).
40. The Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize expert witness
discovery. OR. R. CIv. P. 36; Stevens v. Czerniak, 84 P.3d 140, 144-47 (Or.
2004). The opponents of expert witness discovery successfully argued that it
greatly increases the cost of litigation, and that disclosure of an expert
witness's name before trial generates peer pressure against testifying. Id. at
146.
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Table I. State Procedures for Exchanging
Expert Witness Information
Two-STEP
DISCOVERY

OPEN
DISCOVERY

DISCLOSURE ON PARTY
DEMAND OR COURT

AUTOMATIC
DISCLOSURE

ORDER
_I

Alabama

Florida

California

Alaska

Arkansas

Georgia

Louisiana

Arizona

Delaware

Hawaii

Maine

Colorado

Idaho

Illinois

New Hampshire

Connecticut

Indiana

Iowa

New York

Kansas

Kentucky

Maryland

Texas

Nevada

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Missouri

Mississippi

New Jersey

Montana

North Dakota

Nebraska

Ohio

New Mexico

Oklahoma

North Carolina

South

Pennsylvania

Carolina

Rhode Island

Tennessee

South Dakota

Vermont

Utah

Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

The first column lists the sixteen states that have a two-step
expert witness discovery procedure.4
Under this procedure -

41. ALA. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(A); ARK. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A); DEL. SUPER. CT.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A); DEL. CHAN. CT. R. 26(b)(4)(A); DEL COMM. PL. CT. CIV. R.
26(b)(4)(A); DEL. FAM. CT. CIv. R. 26(g)(3)(A); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A);
IND. R. TRIAL P. 26(B)(4)(a); KY. R. CIV. P. 26.02(4); MASS. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(4)(A); MINN. R. CIv. P. 26.02(d)(1); MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A); MONT. R.
CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(A); NEB. CT. R. DISC. 26(b)(4)(A); N.M. R. CIv. P. 1-026(B)(5);
N.C. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(4)(A); PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.5(a)(1)-(2); R.I. SUPER. R. Clv. P.
26(b)(4)(A); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-26(b)(4)(A) (Michie 2006).
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identical to that in the 1970 version of Federal Rule 26 - a party
first serves a standard expert witness interrogatory. With court
permission, a party then can depose the experts and take other
expert witness discovery.
The second column lists the twenty states that have an open
expert witness discovery procedure."2 Like the states in the first
group, these states have a standard expert witness interrogatory.
Unlike the states in the first group, however, these states do not
require court permission to take other expert witness discovery. 3
The third and fourth columns list states that substitute
expert testimony disclosure for some expert witness discovery. In
the six states listed in column three, a standard expert testimony
disclosure is required only when demanded by a party or ordered
by the court."
In the seven states listed in column four, a
standard expert testimony disclosure is automatically required, as
it is under Federal Rule 26. 4

42. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4)(A); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-26(b)(4)(A) (2006);
HAW. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(5); HAw. DIST. CT. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A); ILL. SUP. CT. R.
213(f)-(g); IOWA CT. R. 1.508(1); MD. R. Civ. P. 2-402(f)(1); MICH. R. CIV. P.
2.302(B)(4)(a); MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(4); N.J. SUPER. TAX SUR. CTS. R. 4:102(d)(1)-(2) & 4:17-4(e); N.D. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A); OHIO R. CIv. P. 26(B)(4)(b);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3226(B)(3)(a) (West 2006); S.C. R. CIv. P.
26(b)(4)(A); TENN. R. CIv. P. 26.02(4)(A); VT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A); VA. SUP.
CT. R. 4:1(b)(4)(A); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 26(b)(5)(A); W. VA. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(4)(A); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 804.01(2)(d)(1) (West 2005); WYO. R. CiV. P.
26(b)(4)(A). The Hawaii circuit court and district court provide for two
different discovery processes. Compare HAW. R. CIV P. 26(b)(5) (providing an
open discovery rule, applicable in cases that meet the circuit court's amount in
controversy threshold), with HAw. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A) (providing a
two-step discovery rule, applicable in cases that fall below the amount in
controversy threshold). In Table I, Hawaii is classified based on the circuit
court rule.
43. All twenty states' open expert witness discovery rules eliminate the
court-permission requirement for expert witness depositions, but five of these
states' rules retain the court-permission requirement for other methods of
expert witness discovery. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.280(b)(4)(A); MICH. R. Civ. P.
2.302(B)(4)(a)(iii); VA. S. CT. R. 4:1(b)(4)(A)(iii);
WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 804.01(2)(d)(1) (West 2004 Supp.); WYo. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
44. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034.210(a) (West 2006) (party demand); LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1425(B) (2005) (court order); ME. R. Civ. P. 16(a) &
26(b)(4)(A) (court order); N.H. R. SUPER. CT. 35(f) (party demand or court
order); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101(d) (Consol. 2002) (party demand); TEX. R. Civ. P.
194.2(f) (party demand). Although the Maine discovery rule (Rule 26) states
that a party obtains expert witness information by interrogatory, the Maine
pre-trial procedure rule (Rule 16) calls for a scheduling order, which, as a
practical matter, requires disclosure. ME. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's
notes of 1999.
45. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2); ARIZ. Civ. P. R. 26.1(2)(6); COLO. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2); CONN. R. SUPER. CT. Civ. 13-4(4); KAN. CiV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60226(b)(6) (West 2003 Supp.); NEV. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2); UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3).
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The states' procedures for exchanging expert witness
information vary in another way. Though almost all of the
standard expert witness interrogatories and standard expert
testimony disclosures cover expert witness opinions, the
interrogatories and disclosures differ in the types of expert
witnesses whose opinions are covered. Table II divides the states
into four groups based on the differences in coverage.
Table II. Differences in Expert Witness Opinion Coverage
IN ANTICIPATION OF
LITIGATION OR FOR TRIAL

RETAINED
EXPERT OR
EQUIVALENT

PARTY,
EMPLOYEE
OR
RETAINED
EXPERT

UNLIMITED
COVERAGE

Alabama

Montana

Alaska

California

Arizona

Arkansas

Nebraska

Kansas

Colorado

Delaware

New Jersey

Louisiana

Connecticut

Florida

New Mexico

Nevada

Illinois

Georgia

North

Utah

Hawaii

Carolina

Maryland
New

Idaho

North Dakota

Hampshire

Indiana

Oklahoma

New York

Iowa

Pennsylvania

Rhode

Kentucky

South

Maine

Carolina

Mass.

South Dakota

Michigan

Tennessee

Minnesota

Virginia

Mississippi

Washington

Missouri

West Virginia

Island
Texas
Vermont

Wisconsin
Wyoming

The first column identifies the thirty-two states where the
standard expert witness interrogatory requires a party to set forth
an expert witness's opinions if developed "in anticipation of
litigation or for trial." 6 This litigation-purpose specification -

46. ALA. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4); ARK. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV.
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identical to the specification in the 1970 version of Federal Rule 26
- prevents the standard expert witness interrogatory from
covering the opinions of many employee experts, party experts,
and independent experts. The following examples illustrate these
three coverage gaps.
Example #1. In a personal injury suit alleging negligent design of
an outdoor metal stairway, the defendant design firm plans to elicit
expert testimony from an employee who helped design the stairway.
This design engineer will opine that the stairway meets all
professional standards.
Result: Because the professional standards opinion was developed
for a non-litigation purpose - designing the stairway - the design
firm's answer to the standard expert witness interrogatory will not
47
include this opinion.
Example #2. In a medical malpractice suit alleging negligent
treatment of a spider bite, the defendant physician plans to read
from a medical text that cautions against early excision and repair
of spider bites. The defendant physician will opine that the medical
text is a reliable authority.
Result: Because the reliable authority opinion was developed for a
non-litigation purpose - treating patients - the defendant

P. 26(b)(4); DEL. CHAN. CT. R. 26(b)(4); DEL. COMM. PL. CT. CIV. R. 26(b)(4);
DEL. FAM. CT. Civ. R. 26(g)(3); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4); GA. CODE ANN. § 911-26(b)(4) (2006); HAW. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5); HAW. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4);
IDAHO R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4); IND. R. TRIAL P. 26(B)(4); IOWA CT. R. 1.508(1); KY.
R. CIV. P. 26.02(4); ME. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); MASS. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); MICH. R.
CiV. P. 2.302(B)(4); MINN. R. CIv. P. 26.02(d)(1)(A); MISS. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4);
MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(4); MONT. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4); NEB. CT. R. Disc.
26(b)(4); N.J. SUPER. TAX SuR. CT. R. 4:10-2(d); N.M. R. CIv. P. 1-026(b)(5);
N.C. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4); N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3226(B)(3)(a) (2006); PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.5(a); S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-26(b)(4) (2006); TENN. R. CWv. P. 26.02(4); VA. SUP. CT.
R. 4:1; WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(b)(5); W. VA. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 804.01(d) (West 2006); WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4). Hawaii's circuit court
and district court have different rules for standard expert witness
interrogatories. Compare HAW. R. CIV P. 26(b)(5) (providing no standard
expert witness interrogatory), with HAW. DIST. CT. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)
(providing a standard expert witness interrogatory covering opinions of
experts if developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial). In
Table II, Hawaii is classified based on the district court rule.
47. The example is based on Smith v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. See Smith,
531 N.E.2d 51, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that design engineer was not a
"retained" expert under ILL. REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 110A, para. 220 (repealed
1995)).
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physician's answer to the standard expert witness interrogatory will
not include this opinion.
Example #3. In a medical malpractice suit alleging that the
defendant emergency room physician negligently failed to diagnose
the plaintiff patient's brain hemorrhage, the plaintiff patient plans
to elicit expert testimony from a neurologist who later treated the
plaintiff. This treating neurologist will opine that the standard of
care required an immediate CT scan or neurological consultation,
yet the defendant emergency room physician took neither step.
Result: Because the standard of care opinion was developed for a
non-litigation purpose - determining the cause of the patient's
medical problems in order to treat these problems - the plaintiff
patient's answer to the standard expert witness interrogatory will
49
not include this opinion.
The second column identifies the five states in which the
standard expert testimony disclosure covers an expert witness's
opinions if the expert witness is a person "retained or specially
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties
as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert
testimony.""
This specification - identical to the specification
appearing in Federal Rule 26's written report requirement - yields
coverage gaps similar to the coverage gaps in the first group of
states.8 ' In the outdoor metal stairway suit, example one, the

48. The example is based on the facts, but not the result in Karr v. Noel.
See Karr, 571 N.E.2d 271, 275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that the defendant
physician had not identified the medical text at the deposition, so the trial
court should have excluded the defendant physician's opinion about the
medical text under ILL. REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 110A, par. 220 (repealed 1995)).
49. The example is based on Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of Belleville v. Martin.
See Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of Belleville, 614 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (Ill. 1993)
(finding that neurologist's opinion was properly admitted under ILL. REV.
STAT. 1985, ch. 110A, par. 220 (repealed 1995)).
50. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60226(b)(6)(B) (West 2006); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1425(B) (2006); NEV.
R. CIV. P. 16.1(a)(2)(B); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B).
51. The coverage of expert witness opinions differs slightly in the two
groups of states. For example, in the outdoor metal stairway suit, suppose the
design engineer's employment duties happen to include giving expert
testimony on a regular basis. Based on this employment duty, a Federal Rule
26-type rule would require the design firm to include the design engineer's
professional standards opinion in its expert testimony disclosure. Yet, because
of the non-litigation purpose for developing the opinion, a litigation-purpose
type rule would not require the design firm to include the opinion in its
answer to the standard expert witness interrogatory. As a further example,
suppose the defendant physician in the spider bite suit develops the reliable
authority opinion for trial. Based on that purpose for developing the opinion,
a litigation-purpose type rule would require the defendant physician to include
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design engineer was hired to do design work, he developed the
professional standards opinion while doing this type of work, and
he does not regularly give expert testimony. In the spider bite
suit, example two, the defendant physician developed the reliable
authority opinion as part of his medical education. In the brain
hemorrhage suit, example three, the treating neurologist was seen
for medical treatment and developed the standard of care opinion
while giving this treatment. Therefore, the expert testimony
disclosures in the three suits will not include, respectively, the
professional standards, reliable authority, and standard of care
opinions.
The third column identifies the one state - California - in
which the standard expert witness declaration covers the general
substance of an expert witness's testimony if the expert witness is
a party expert, an employee expert, or a retained expert.52
Assuming the general substance includes the expert's opinions,
the declaration in the outdoor metal stairway suit, example one,
will include the professional standards opinion of the design
engineer - who is an employee expert. The declaration in the
spider bite suit, example two, will include the reliable authority
opinion of the defendant physician - who is a party expert. Yet,
the declaration in the brain hemorrhage suit, example three, will
not include the standard of care opinion of the treating neurologist
- who is neither an employee expert, nor a party expert, nor a
retained expert.53

the opinion in his answer to the standard expert witness interrogatory. Yet,
the defendant physician might not be the in-house equivalent of a retained
expert witness. Whether the defendant physician would be an in-house

equivalent whose reliable authority opinion must be disclosed in these
circumstances depends on whether the term "specially employed" to provide
expert testimony in the case refers to an expert specially hired for this purpose
or an expert specially used for this purpose. See infra Part II.A. (discussing in
great detail employee experts). A Federal Rule 26-type rule would require the
defendant physician to include the opinion in his expert testimony disclosure
only if "specially employed" means specially used, because the defendant

physician obviously did not specially hire himself.
52. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2034.210(a)(2), 2034.260(c)(2) (West 2006).
53. The California Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a
treating physician becomes a retained expert just by testifying about the
standard of care. In Schreiber v. Estate of Kiser, the Court said the following:
to the extent a physician acquires personal knowledge of the relevant

facts independently of the litigation, .. . no expert witness declaration is
required, and he may testify as to any opinions formed on the basis of

facts independently acquired and informed by his training, skill, and
experience.

This may well include opinions regarding causation and

standard of care because such issues are inherent in a physician's work.
989 P.2d 720, 726 (Cal. 1999).
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The fourth column identifies the ten states in which the
standard expert witness interrogatory or expert testimony
disclosure has no (or almost no) limit on its coverage of expert
M
In this group of states, the interrogatory
witness opinions.5
answers or disclosures in the three examples will include,
respectively, the professional standards, reliable authority, and
standard of care opinions.5"
Tables I and II together make two contrasting points. Table I
shows that only seven states have streamlined their standard
exchanges of expert witness information as fully as Federal Rule
Table II
26's automatic expert testimony disclosure feature.
shows, however, that eleven states have standard exchanges that
cover the opinions of more expert witnesses than are covered by
Federal Rule 26's written report requirement. In other words,
Federal Rule 26's standard exchange is on the leading edge in
streamlining, but is behind the leading edge in coverage.
II. WRITTEN REPORT REQUIREMENT COVERAGE DECISIONS

Since 1993, federal courts have filed a substantial number of
Subpart A examines the
written report coverage decisions.
Subparts B and C
decisions concerning employee experts.
examine the decisions concerning party experts and independent
experts.
A. Employee Experts5"
Federal Rule 26 uses a special employment test and a regular
testimony test to single out the employees who are covered by the

54. ARIz. Civ. P. R. 26.1(2)(6); COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2); CONN. R. SUPER.
CT. CIV. 13-4(4); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(f)-(g); MD. R. Cr'. P. 2-402(f)(1); N.H. R.

SUPER. CT. 35(f); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101(d) (Consol. 2002); R.I. SUPER. CT. R.
CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(A); TEX. R. Civ. P. 194.2(f)(3); VT. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
Maryland is listed in this fourth group of states because the standard expert
witness interrogatory in the Maryland rule is nearly as comprehensive in its
expert witness opinion coverage - the only kind of expert witness whose
opinions are not covered is a party expert. MD. R. Civ. P. 2-402(f)(1)(A). Ohio
is listed neither in this fourth group of states nor in any other group, because
its rule's standard interrogatory requires a statement of the "subject matter"
on which the expert is expected to testify and does not require a statement of
the expert's opinions. OHIO R. CIV. P. 26(B)(4)(b).
55. In Maryland, however, the interrogatory answer in the spider bite suit
will omit the reliable authority opinion, because the defendant physician is a
party expert. MD. R. Civ. P. 2-402(f)(1)(A).
56. For another analysis of the decisions on employee experts, see George
V. Mickum & Luther L. Jajek, Guise, Contrivance, or Artful Dodging?: The
Discovery Rules Governing Testifying Employee Experts, 24 REV. LITIG. 301
(2005) [hereinafter Artful Dodging] (providing another analysis of the

decisions on employee experts).
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written report requirement. 7 The special employment test covers
an employee who is "specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case."'
The regular testimony test covers an
employee "whose duties as an employee of the party regularly
involve giving expert testimony."59 A party must provide a written
6
report prepared by any employee expert who meets either test. 0
The regular testimony test raises the obvious question of how
often an employee must give expert testimony for the employee to
be considered "regularly" giving this type of testimony. The
special employment test raises the more difficult question of what
it means for an expert to be "specially employed" to provide expert
testimony in a case. The word "employed" can mean either "hired"
or "used."61 If specially employed means "specially hired," an
employee who was hired for an ordinary purpose never has to
prepare a written report when giving expert testimony.
If
specially employed instead means "specially used," an employee
who was hired for an ordinary purpose, but who was assigned
special work when the case arose, must prepare a written report
when giving expert testimony based on this special work.
The special employment test was first used in Federal Rule
26 to identify a type of non-testifying expert whose work is
generally shielded from discovery."2 Since 1970, Federal Rule 26
has required a showing of exceptional circumstances that justify
discovery of the facts known by, and opinions held by, a nontestifying expert who was "retained or specially employed.., in
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial."' According to
the Advisory Committee, Federal Rule 26 does not require this
showing when the expert is "simply a general employee of the
party not specially employed on the case."' The Committee did
not say, however, whether a "specially employed" expert differs
from a "general employee" expert based on special hiring or special
use.6
During the interval between the 1970 and 1993
amendments to Federal Rule 26, some federal courts equated

57. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(B).

58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 466 (4th ed. 1999).
62. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (discussing subdivision
(b)(4)(B) of the 1970 Amendment).
65. See id. (noting only that the rule "deals with an expert who has been
retained or specifically employed by the party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial ... but who is not expected to be called as a witness").
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"specially employed" with "specially hired," while other federal
courts equated "specially employed" with "specially used."
A leading decision that equated "specially employed" with
"specially hired" was Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.' The Virginia Electric court said:
"[Sipecially employed" refers only to the manner by which the
services of the expert are obtained; that is to say, that the expert is
put on the payroll for the specific purpose of deriving facts and
opinions for use in trial preparation or anticipated litigation. The
distinction between "retained" and "specially employed" is the
difference between hiring the expert as an67independent contractor
and hiring him as an employee pro hac vice.
A leading decision that equated "specially employed" with
"specially used" was Seiffer v. Topsy's International,Inc.1 8 In this
securities fraud suit, an auditing firm's attorney asked the
auditing firm's partner to assess the relevant working papers and
audit reports.69 Because the partner had not worked on the
challenged audits, the Seiffer court ruled that the partner was a
specially employed non-testifying expert whose work was shielded
from discovery.7" The Seiffer court explained, "an in-house expert
may be specially employed as well as an expert drawn from
personnel other than the party's own." "
The two competing interpretations advanced different Federal
Rule 26 purposes. The "specially hired" interpretation advanced
Federal Rule 26's truth-seeking purpose by opening up to
discovery the work of all employee experts except for the handful
who are hired pro hac vice."2 The "specially used" interpretation
advanced Federal Rule 26's case evaluation and expense reduction
purposes by encouraging attorneys to have scientific, technical,
and other specialized matters assessed by employee experts,

66. 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975).
67. Id. at 407; accord Dallas v. Marion Power Shovel Co., Inc., 126 F.R.D.
539, 541 (S.D. Ill. 1989); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas v. Marathon Oil Co.,
109 F.R.D. 12, 15-16 (D. Neb. 1983) (referring to the court's analysis of the
term "specifically employed").
68. 69 F.R.D. 69 (D. Kan. 1975).
69. Id. at 72.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 73 n.3; accord Marine Petroleum v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641
F.2d 984, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1979); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 132 F.R.D. 437,
441-42 (S.D. La. 1990); In re Sinking of Barge, 92 F.R.D. 486, 489 (S.D. Tex.
1981) [hereinafter Ranger I] (discussing the application of Federal Rule 26(b)
to in-house experts).
72. See Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,

68 F.R.D. 397, 408 (E.D. Va. 1975) (discussing the distinction between a
general employee and an employee specifically retained in anticipation of

litigation).
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whose work generally costs less than work done by outside
experts. "
During the 1980s, legal commentators urged clarification of
Federal Rule 26's non-testifying expert provision. 4
The
clarification, however, was not made.7 r Then, in 1993, the words
"specially employed" were used to single out a type of expert
witness who must prepare a written report."6 For a second time,
the Advisory Committee did not say whether "specially employed"
meant "specially hired" or "specially used.""
In this second
context, the "specially hired" versus "specially used" controversy
has reappeared.
A leading decision that equates "specially employed" with
"specially hired" is Navajo Nation v. Norris.8 In Navajo Nation, a
Native American tribe planned to elicit testimony about tribal
customs and traditions from employees who did not regularly give
expert testimony for the tribe.79 The Navajo Nation court ruled
that these tribal employees were not "specially employed" expert
witnesses covered by Federal Rule 26's written report requirement
because:
[Federal Rule 26(a)(2)(B)] explicitly identifies two categories of
experts from whom reports are required; one comprising nonemployees of a party especially retained or employed for the

73. In Marine Petroleum, the Court of Appeals gave the following reason for

shielding from discovery the work done by a consultant who originally was
hired for a non-litigation purpose and then was assigned special work for a

litigation purpose:
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) implicitly recognizes that a party might well be

deterred from thorough preparation of his case were it possible for his
opponent to freely discover information from a hired expert whose
assistance is important but not yet so vital as to require his testimony at
trial. The rule's tacit acknowledgment of the necessity of meticulous
preparation has equal force whether the expert is one originally and
exclusively retained for anticipated litigation or one whose employment
responsibilities are expanded to encompass consultation and advice in

expectation of litigation.
641 F.2d at 992-93.
74. James R. Pielemeier, Discovery of Non-Testifying "In-House" Experts
Under FederalRule of Civil Procedure23, 58 IND. L. J. 597, 625 (1983); Sheila
E. McDonald, Comment, The In-House Expert Witness: Discovery Under the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 33 S.D. L. REV. 283, 301 (1988).
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (retaining current form without
clarification).
76. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note (analyzing subdivision
(a)(2)(B) of the 1993 Amendment).
78. 189 F.R.D. 610 (E.D. Wash. 1999).

79. Id. at 611.
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particular case and one comprising employees of a party who
regularly testify for the employer party.80
By referring to "especially retained or employed" expert
witnesses as "non-employees" apart from their involvement in the
case, the court indicated that "specially employed" means
"specially hired."
A leading decision that equates "specially employed" with
"specially used" is KW Plastics v. United States Can Co. 8 In this
breach of contract suit, the can company planned to have its vice
president give expert testimony supporting its damage claim."
The KW Plastics court ruled that the vice president was a specially
employed expert witness covered by Federal Rule 26's written
report requirement because:
An employee is "employed" when she is "put to use or service."...
The adverb "specially" is "used with reference to a particular
purpose" that is "surpassing what is common or usual."... When a
corporate party designates one of its employees as an expert, it
typically authorizes the employee to perform special actions that fall
outside of the employee's normal scope of employment.a
Just as the "specially hired" and "specially used"
interpretations advanced different Federal Rule 26 purposes with
non-testifying experts, these competing interpretations advance
different Federal Rule 26 purposes regarding testifying experts.
The "specially hired" interpretation advances Federal Rule 26's
expense reduction purpose by requiring written reports for only
the handful of employee experts who are "professional"
The "specially used" interpretation advances Federal
witnesses.'

80. Id. at 611-12. (emphasis added); accord Adams v. Gateway, Inc., No.
2:02 CV 106, 2006 WL 644848, at *3 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2006); Duluth
Lighthouse for the Blind v. C.G. Bretting Mfg. Co., Inc., 199 F.R.D. 320, 32425 (D. Minn. 2000) (citing Navajo Nation for the proposition that in-house
employee experts are not subject to the automatic disclosure requirement).
81. 199 F.R.D. 687 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
82. Id. at 688.
83. Id. at 690 (citations omitted); accord Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Signtech USA, Ltd., 177 F.R.D. 459, 460-61 (D. Minn. 1998); Day v. Consol.
Rail Corp., No. 95 CIV. 968, 1996 WL 257654, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1996);
Prieto v. Malgor, 361 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating in dictum
that a written report is required when an employee expert "provid[es] a
technical evaluation of evidence he [has] reviewed for trial").
84. The Adams court justified equating "specially employed" with "specially
hired" as follows:
The 1993 amendments added a general requirement that a party taking
an expert witness's deposition would pay "the expert a reasonable fee for
time spent in responding to discovery." This expense is only a concern
as to experts specially employed or retained, since persons "generally
employed" are not charging their employer an additional fee for the
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Rule 26's truth-seeking and efficiency purposes by requiring
written reports for all employee experts except for those whose
testimony is basically factual.'
If a court thinks that Federal Rule 26's truth-seeking purpose
generally outweighs its other purposes, having the words
"specially employed" apply both to non-testifying experts and to
testifying experts creates a dilemma. With non-testifying experts,
the court should equate "specially employed" with "specially hired"
in order to maximize the number of employee experts whose work
is open to discovery. With testifying experts, the court should
equate "specially employed" with "specially used" in order to
maximize the number of employees who must prepare written
reports when giving expert testimony. The court cannot have it
both ways if it gives effect to Federal Rule 26's amendment
history. When words are copied from one Federal Rule 26
amendment to another Federal Rule 26 amendment and are used
in both amendments to single out a type of expert to whom special
rules apply, the words presumptively have the same meaning in
both amendments.' So, does the court sacrifice Federal Rule 26's
truth-seeking purpose with non-testifying experts or with
testifying experts?

work as an expert witness. Presumably, the traditional tools of
deposition and interrogatory available for expert witnesses who are
"generally employed" don't incur any extraordinary out of pocket costs
for the employer-party. The 1993 Notes hint at the interplay between
reports and expenses, suggesting cost avoidance is a reason reports are
required when expert expenses are in play ....The plain language of
the rule facilitates a party's use of an employee for expert witness
testimony without the burden of a formal report. Such a report might
be a heavy burden for a technician or manager familiar with a
sophisticated process or practice, but unaccustomed to the burden of
communication ....But for an employee who is essentially an "inhouse" expert witness, the burden of a report is not great and prevents
use of employment status to protect those who are truly "professional"
witnesses.
2006 WL 644848, at *2 (footnotes omitted).
85. See Signtech, 177 F.R.D. at 461 ("requiring testifying experts to submit
written reports ...not only ...will serve to streamline or even eliminate the
need for deposition testimony, but ...will undoubtedly serve to minimize the
element of surprise"); see also Prieto, 361 F.3d at 1318 (stating, "the Rule
exclude[s] at least some employees but . . .that exception [is] limited to
experts who are testifying as fact witnesses, although they may also express
some expert opinions") (internal quotation omitted).
86. See Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S_,127 S. Ct.
1423, 1432 (2007) (reasoning that there is a presumption that identical words
used in the same act have the same meaning).
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B. Party Experts
Parties sometimes testify as expert witnesses on their own
behalf, such as a defendant physician who gives expert testimony
in a medical malpractice case.87 Whether party experts must
prepare written reports depends, as it does with employee experts,
on the meaning of the words "specially employed."' If "specially
employed" means "specially hired," party experts never have to
prepare written reports, because parties never hire themselves to
give expert testimony. If "specially employed" instead means
"specially used," parties must prepare written reports when they
do special work for the purpose of giving expert testimony.
A court should choose the same meaning for party experts
that it has chosen for employee experts. For both types of experts,
a court can advance either Federal Rule 26's expense reduction
purpose or Federal Rule 26's truth-seeking and efficiency
purposes. 9 For both types of experts, a court must consider the
effect its choice will have on discovery of the work done by nontestifying experts of the same type.9 °
Moreover, if a court chooses different meanings for party
experts and employee experts, the court will enter conflicting
orders when an expert is both a party expert and an employee
expert. For example, in a medical malpractice case brought
against a physician and the medical clinic that employs the
physician, the physician might testify on her own behalf and also
on the clinic's behalf. The physician's dual role makes her both a
party expert and an employee expert. Suppose she bases part of
her testimony on special work she did for the purpose of giving
expert testimony. If the court equates "specially employed" with
"specially hired" for party experts, but equates it with "specially
used" for employee experts, the physician will not have to provide
her own written report as a party expert, but the clinic, oddly

87. See, e.g., Laplace-Bayard v. Batlle, 295 F.3d 157, 165 (1st Cir. 2002)
(holding that the physician could give an expert opinion without a written
report, where the opinion testimony was elicited on plaintiffs crossexamination); see also Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1042 (7th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a party can testify on its own behalf as an expert).

88. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
89. See supra notes 84-85 (equating special employment with special hiring
advances Federal Rule 26's expense reduction purpose by never requiring
written reports for party experts, while equating special employment with
special use advances Federal Rule 26's truth-seeking and efficiency purposes
by requiring written reports for all party experts except those whose testimony

is basically factual). As explained earlier, courts also face this policy choice
with employee experts. Id.
90. See supra notes 72-73 (discussing the implications of a court ordering
discovery of non-testifying experts).
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enough, will have to provide the written report prepared by the
physician as an employee expert.
Assuming that each court chooses the same meaning for both
types of experts, the "specially hired" versus "specially used"
controversy will spread from employee experts to party experts.
Perhaps because parties give expert testimony less often, however,
the controversy has not spread as yet. In the two written report
coverage decisions that have involved party experts, the courts
resolved the written report coverage issue without spreading the
controversy.
In Laplace-Bayardv. Batlle,9' a medical malpractice case, the
defendant physician gave expert testimony only about his actions
The
and decisions during his treatment of the plaintiff.9'
physician obviously did not specially hire himself to provide this
testimony, and he did not specially use himself for this purpose
either, having developed his opinions in the ordinary course of
treatment. Therefore, without choosing between the "specially
hired" and "specially used" interpretations, the court of appeals
ruled that Federal Rule 26's written report requirement did not
cover the defendant physician.93
In Applera Corporation v. MJ Research, Inc.,94 a patent
infringement case, the defendant co-founders of the defendant
corporation thought they could give expert testimony about patent
invalidity without having to provide their own written reports."
The district court's scheduling order, however, required written
Therefore, without choosing
reports "from all trial experts."'
between the "specially hired" and "specially used" interpretations,
and without determining whether the co-founders had developed
their patent invalidity opinions in the ordinary course of business,
the district court ruled that the scheduling order required the cofounders to provide written reports. 97

91. 295 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2002).
92. Id. at 165.
93. See id. (noting that no written report was required where defendant

physician testified to his opinion on cross-examination).
94. 220 F.R.D. 13 (D. Conn. 2004).
95. Id. at 14-16. The corporation employed the two co-founders, making
them employee experts as well as party experts. Id. at 16. The defendants
identified sixteen other employees of the corporation as expert witnesses on

patent invalidity. Id. In addition to the written report violation discussed in
the text, the defendants violated Federal Rule 26's expert witness
identification requirement. Id. at 18-19.
96. Id. at 17-18.
97. The district court cited the conflicting interpretations of the special
employment test without indicating which interpretation it favored. Id. at 19
n.6.
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C. Independent Experts
Independent experts of various types testify as expert
witnesses. Among them are health care providers who have
treated the injured party98 and government investigators who have
examined the scene, the wreckage, or other relevant evidence.'
When a party calls an independent expert as a witness, the party
usually has no control over the expert, and therefore, cannot
require the expert to prepare a written report.
The Advisory Committee made the following statement about
the application of the written report requirement to treating
physicians: "A treating physician ...can be deposed or called to
10 0
testify at trial without any requirement for a written report."
This stated policy makes sense. If the party that calls a treating
physician usually cannot get the physician to prepare a written
report, requiring this party to provide the report will lead to the
exclusion of treating physician testimony in most personal injury
trials - a serious interference with the search for truth.
Some courts require the party that calls a treating physician
to provide a written report in certain exceptional circumstances.
These exceptions are: (1) the attorney referral exception, 10 ' (2) the
attorney-supplied information exception,' 0 ' and (3) the causationprognosis exception. 3 These exceptions make sense only to the
extent that they are based on effective control over the treating
physician, so the party can get the physician to prepare a written
report.
The attorney referral exception is illustrated by Hall v.
In this personal injury case, the district court required
Sykes."
the injured party to provide a written report for every medical care
The district
provider to whom she was referred by her attorney.'

98. See, e.g., Knorr v. Dillard's Store Services, Inc., No. Civ.A. 04-3208,

2005 WL 2060905, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2005) (allowing a treating
physician to testify to the treatment rendered and the opinion derived

therefrom); Rogers v. Detroit Edison Co., 328 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692 (E.D. Mich.
2004) (finding that the psychologist could testify as a treating physician);
Kirkland v. Union Pacific R.R., 189 F.R.D. 604, 608 (D. Nev. 1999)
(mentioning that a treating physician can testify to information obtained

during treatment).
99. See, e.g., Brandt Distr. Co., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 822, 825 (8th
Cir. 2001) (discussing a situation where the fire department captain testified
that the fire in question was a "fraud fire").
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee note.

101. Hall v. Sykes, 164 F.R.D. 46 (E.D. Va. 1995).
102. Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 2d 556 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
103. Thomas v. Consol. Rail Corp., 169 F.R.D. 1 (D. Mass. 1996).
104. 164 F.R.D. 46 (E.D. Va. 1995); Navrude v. United States, No. C01-4039PAZ, 2003 WL 356091, at *7 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 11, 2003).

105. Hall, 164 F.R.D. at 49.
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court explained, "when an attorney selects the physician for
treatment as well as testimony it is presumed the physician was
selected for expert testimony. " "
This exception is based on the referring attorney's influence
over the treating physician. When an attorney, the attorney's law
firm, and other law firms refer injured parties to the same
physicians case after case, these referrals are usually due to the
physicians' reputation for high quality litigation work rather than
high quality medical care. If a referring attorney asks one of these
physicians for a written report, the physician will almost surely
honor the attorney's request in order to protect this significant
source of income.
The attorney-supplied information exception is illustrated by
Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc. l 7 In this products liability case, an
ice hockey player sued the manufacturer of the helmet and mask
that he was wearing when he fractured his spine." 8 The medical
records contained the treating physician's causation opinion, along
with the medical history and physical findings on which this
opinion was based."°
In a summary judgment affidavit
reaffirming this causation opinion, the treating physician further
stated that the injuries were consistent with the events shown on
a tape of the accident that the physician viewed at the request of
the injured party's attorney."' The district court struck this
reference to the accident tape on the ground that the hockey
player had not provided a written report for the treating
physician."' The district court explained that a written report is
required for a treating physician unless the "physician's opinions
derive from information learned during the actual treatment of the
patient - as opposed to being subsequently supplied by an
attorney. " "
This exception seems to be based on the attorney's or the
injured party's influence over the treating physician. When a

106. Id. Although the district court's stated presumption concerns attorney
referral to a "physician," the attorney referral in question was to a

chiropractor. Id.
107. 300 F. Supp. 2d 556 (N.D. Ohio 2004).

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

558-59.
561-62.
561.
561-62.

112. Id. at 560 (quoting Sullivan v. Block, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 497, 501 (D. Md.
1997)); accord Knorr, 2005 WL 2060905, at *3; Hawkins, 210 F.R.D. at 211-12;
Tzoumis, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 876; Lewis v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth.,
No. 97 CIV. 0607(PKL), 2001 WL 21256, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2001)
(determining that the plaintiffs physician's testimony cannot extend beyond
the opinions formed during the course of treatment).
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treating physician develops an opinion based on a review of
attorney-supplied treatment records, deposition transcripts, and
other information, the physician is doing substantial litigationrelated work. Whether the physician does this work for a fee or to
help the injured party, a court can presume that an attorney or an
injured party who can get a treating physician to do this much
work on a case also can get the physician to prepare a written
report.
This presumption is not necessarily justified, however, if the
physician developed the opinion in the ordinary course of
treatment and is reviewing the attorney-supplied information for
the limited purpose of defending this opinion at trial. Reviewing
the attorney-supplied information might require just minutes of
the physician's time, but preparing a written report might require
hours of the physician's time - depending, of course, on its
contents.
A Federal Rule 26 written report normally addresses an
11
expert witness' entire direct testimony."
If the written report for
a treating physician who has reviewed attorney-supplied
information must address the physician's entire direct testimony,
the report will have to address such matters as the relevant parts
of the patient's medical history, the relevant physical findings, the
physician's diagnosis, the physician's causation and prognosis
opinions, the physician's qualifications, and so forth. A court
should not presume that the attorney or the injured party can get
the treating physician to set aside the hours required to prepare
this type of written report. A court should presume, however, that
the attorney or the injured party can get the physician to set aside
the minutes required to prepare a streamlined written report
covering just the testimony based on attorney-supplied
information. 114

113. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note (discussing paragraph
(a)(2)(B) of the 1993 Amendment and requiring a complete report of expert

testimony).
114. Mohney illustrates why a court should interpret Federal Rule 26 to
require only a streamlined written report covering the testimony based on
attorney-supplied information. By asking the treating physician to review the
accident tape, the hockey player's attorney perhaps hoped to diffuse a line of
cross-examination designed to show that the physician relied on an inherently
unreliable description of the accident.

Q. You didn't see the position of the plaintiff's head when it hit the
boards, did you?

Q. You relied on what X told you about the position of the plaintiffs
head when it hit the boards?
Q. X appeared to be upset about his friend's injury, didn't he?
The physician's review of the tape apparently confirmed that the accident
happened as described. A streamlined written report covering the testimony
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Thomas v. ConsolidatedRail Corp. illustrates the causationprognosis exception.115 In this personal injury case, the district
court said that a treating physician steps into the shoes of a
retained expert when the treating physician develops opinions
"beyond what was necessary to provide appropriate care." 116 On
the theory that opinions about causation and prognosis are
unnecessary to provide appropriate care, the district court
required the plaintiff to provide written reports for three treating
physicians who had these types of opinions."'
This causation-prognosis exception is, however, a minority
interpretation of Federal Rule 26.18 In Zurba v. United States,"9

based on attorney-supplied information essentially would say: I've viewed the
accident tape and it doesn't change my causation opinion. The description of
the accident given to me was accurate. This written report might require less
time to prepare than the time required to review the accident tape, so
requiring it probably will not lead to exclusion of the treating physician's
testimony about the tape.
Despite the practical importance of requiring the right type of written
report, the written report coverage decisions generally do not discuss what a
written report must contain when a treating physician's testimony is based
partly on attorney-supplied information. For example, in Mohney the injured
hockey player had provided no written report of any type for the treating
physician, so the district court had no reason to discuss whether a streamlined
written report would have supported admission of the parts of the affidavit
that referred to the accident tape. Mohney, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
115. 169 F.R.D. 1.
116. Id. at 2.
117. Id.; accord Brandon v. Vill. of Maywood, 179 F. Supp. 2d 847, 859 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (holding that opinions about plaintiffs prognosis required a written
disclosure); Zarecki v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1566, 1573
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (ruling that the physician should have been disclosed as an
expert because her opinion including information relating to the causation of
plaintiffs injuries). An injured party's medical records sometimes do not
include a treating physician's causation and prognosis opinions. See, e.g.,
Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 875, 883 (5th Cir.
2004) (stating, "those [medical] records did not address causation and thus did
not alert State Farm that [the treating physician] might give expert testimony
about that subject"). In addition, these opinions sometimes change based on
further tests, treatment, or study. See, e.g., Peck v. Hudson City Sch. Dist.,
100 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating, "[i]f [the physician] is
testifying solely about Plaintiffs treatment and care, then Plaintiff had no
obligation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) to supplement its responses to
Defendants' discovery demands, as [the Defendant] contends"). By requiring
causation and prognosis opinions to be stated in a written report that must be
updated if the opinions change, a court protects other parties from the
prejudice that might result from surprise testimony about causation and
prognosis. See, e.g., Hamburger, 361 F.3d at 883 (noting, "State Farm would
have been prejudiced if [the physician's] lately identified expert testimony
about causation had been allowed").
118. See, e.g., Martin v. CSX Transp., Inc., 215 F.R.D. 554, 556-57 (S.D. Ind.
2003) (discussing the decisions that recognize or reject the exception);
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for example, the district court did not require a written report
when a treating physician testified to causation and prognosis
opinions, because "it is common for a treating physician to
consider his patient's prognosis as well as the cause of the
patient's injuries. " "'
If treating physicians commonly develop
causation and prognosis opinions - which seems likely - a court
should not presume that an attorney or an injured party can
persuade a physician who has expressed these types of opinions to
prepare a written report.
III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Two years ago, the Advisory Committee began considering
whether to recommend that Federal Rule 26's expert written
report disclosure requirement should cover all employee experts. 121
The Committee rightly has focused on federal court experience
with this requirement, 212 but the Committee also should consider
state court experience with more comprehensive exchanges of
expert witness information.12' In particular, the Committee should
consider the Illinois
courts' application of its expert witness
24
interrogatory rule. 1

McCloughan v. City of Springfield, 208 F.R.D. 236, 241-42 (C.D. Ill.
2002)
(discussing why the majority rule applied in this case); Kent v. Katz, No. 2:99CV-189, 2000 WL 33711516, at *1-2 (D. Vt. Aug. 9,2000) (concluding that a
physician's testimony may include statements about causation and prognosis
as long as those opinions were derived from treating the patient, without
preparing a written report); Shapardon v. West Beach Estates, 172 F.R.D. 415,
416-17 (D. Haw. 1997) (holding that since the physician was not disclosed as
an "expert," any testimony based on information gathered outside of the
treatment would be excluded).
119. 202 F.R.D. 590 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
120. Id. at 592.
121. Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Oct. 27-28, 2005, lines
459-559, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CV11-2005-min.
pdf [hereinafter Advisory Committee Minutes 2005].
122. The Committee minutes do not indicate, however, that the Committee
has surveyed judges or attorneys in districts with local rules or scheduling
orders that require more comprehensive standard exchanges of expert witness
information. Id.
123. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text (discussing the
categorization of states based on how courts apply their rules regarding expert
disclosure).
124. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(f). This rule also requires the exchange of
information about lay witnesses, but the text discusses only the parts of the
rule covering expert witnesses.
The author has discussed the rule's
background and drafting history in a previous law review article. Keith H.
Beyler, Witness Disclosurein Illinois, 28 S.ILL. U. L.J. 225 (2004) [hereinafter
Witness Disclosure].
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The Illinois rule divides expert witnesses into two mutually
exclusive categories.'25 The "controlled" expert witness category
includes all employee experts, party experts, and retained
experts." 6 The "independent" expert witness category includes all
experts who are neither employee experts, nor party experts, nor
retained experts. 127
Each category determines what information parties must
exchange about their expert witnesses. For controlled expert
witnesses, the standard expert witness interrogatory requires
information comparable - but not identical - to the information
contained in a Federal Rule 26 written report. 2 ' For independent
expert witnesses, the standard expert witness interrogatory
requires a statement of "the opinions the party expects to elicit."'29
An answer sufficiently states these opinions if it gives "reasonable
notice" of an independent expert witness's testimony, taking into
account the limitations on the party's knowledge of the facts
known by and opinions held by the expert.2 0
Drawing on the Illinois courts' experience in developing and
applying their expert witness interrogatory rule, the Advisory
Committee should recommend that Federal Rule 26 require
parties to provide written reports for controlled expert witnesses,
and written statements disclosing the opinions they expect to elicit
from independent expert witnesses. Parts A and B explain why
the two changes should be made. The Appendix shows how to
make the changes via a Federal Rule 26 amendment.

125. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(f)(2)-(3).

126. Id. at 213(f)(3).
127. Id. at 213(f)(2).
128. The party calling a controlled expert witness must identify: "(i) the

subject matter on which the witness will testify; (ii) the conclusions and
opinions of the witness and the bases therefor; (iii) the qualifications of the
witness; and (iv) any reports prepared by the witness about the case." Id. at
213(f)(3). The core of a Federal Rule 26 written report - the opinions the

expert will express and the basis and reasons for these opinions - is covered by
the Illinois rule in (ii) above. A Federal Rule 26 written report requires the
following information not covered by the Illinois rule's standard expert witness
interrogatory: the data or other information the expert considered in forming
the opinions (as opposed to relied on as a basis for the opinions); the exhibits
the expert will use to summarize or support the opinions; the expert's

compensation; and a list of cases in which the expert has testified at trial or
deposition in the past four years. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (listing the
additional requirements not present in the corresponding Illinois rule).
129. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(f)(2). The interrogatory also requires a statement

of the "subjects" (i.e., the topics) on which the independent expert will testify.
Id.
130. Id.
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A. Controlled Expert Witnesses
Federal Rule 26 should require written reports for all
employee experts, party experts, and retained experts for three
reasons. First, the extension of the written report requirement to
the employee experts and party experts who have been excused
until now from preparing these reports will advance Federal Rule
26's truth-seeking and efficiency purposes. Second, the extension
will eliminate the interpretation and application problems
associated with Federal Rule 26.
Third, the extension will
discourage improper expert witness preparation by making more
of that preparation discoverable.
1.

Truth-Seeking and Efficiency

During the revision of the Illinois expert witness
interrogatory rule, the Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee
("Illinois Committee") considered the issue the Advisory
Committee is now considering. Just as Federal Rule 26 has a
written report requirement that was developed primarily for
retained experts, the Illinois rule has a standard interrogatory
that was developed primarily for retained experts. Just as the
Advisory Committee is considering whether this written report
requirement should cover all employee experts instead of a select
group of employee experts, the Illinois Committee considered
whether the retained expert interrogatory should cover all
employee experts instead of a select group of employee experts.
The Illinois Committee considered whether this interrogatory also
should cover all party experts, but party experts raise virtually the
same issue as employee experts. 31
The Illinois Committee initially proposed following the
Federal Rule 26 limited exchange model.132 Borrowing almost
verbatim from Federal Rule 26, the Illinois Committee proposed
rewriting the Illinois rule so the retained expert interrogatory
covered a select group of employee experts and party experts.in

131. Of the eleven states with standard expert witness information
exchanges more comprehensive than the Federal Rule 26 exchange, only
Maryland treats employee experts and party experts differently. See supra
notes 52 and 54 (discussing the differences in the exchange of witness

information).
132. Witness Disclosure, supra note 124, at 244 n.96.
133. Specifically, the Illinois Committee proposed that the interrogatory
cover any expert "specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or

whose duties as an employee of the party involve giving expert testimony." Id.
The initial proposal deleted the word "regularly" from Federal Rule 26's words
so the interrogatory's coverage did not hinge on how often the employee gives
expert testimony. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[41:117

Illinois judges and Illinois attorneys criticized this part of the
initial proposal, however, on two grounds. First, a party has no
trouble providing detailed information about the testimony to be
given by any employee expert or party expert; therefore, limiting
the interrogatory's coverage to a select group was unnecessary.134
Second, other parties need detailed information about the
testimony to be given by any employee expert or party expert, so
limiting the interrogatory's coverage to a select group was
unwise."' These criticisms of the initial proposal led the Illinois
Committee to ask whether a comprehensive exchange that
provides detailed information about the opinions of all employee
experts and party experts would better serve the Illinois rule's
truth-seeking and trial preparation efficiency purposes without
substantially increasing litigation cost.
The comprehensive exchange does, of course, better serve the
truth-seeking purpose. The comprehensive exchange includes
information needed to prepare for cross-examination of, and to
rebut testimony from, all employee and party experts. The limited
exchange includes information needed to prepare for crossexamination of, and to rebut testimony from, only a select group of
employee and party experts. 136 True, parties can get most of this
additional information by taking depositions and asking the right
questions. If an employee expert or party expert revises an
opinion between deposition and trial, however, the expert's
deposition testimony does not provide all of the information
needed to prepare to cross-examine or rebut the expert. The
comprehensive exchange ensures that this deposition testimony
will be supplemented; the limited exchange does not. 137

134. Id. at 247.
135. Id. As one trial judge commented, an employee expert often becomes
the cornerstone of the case by helping the jury understand the factory, the
hospital, or the accident scene. Transcript of the Special 2001 Mid-Year
Public Hearing of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee, at 109-10
(June 18, 2001) (statement of Judge Susan Zwick), available at http://legalrec
lamations.blogspot.com/2007/03/annual-report-of-illinois-supreme-court.html.
Many attorneys share the judge's opinion about the influence of experts who
have direct experience and who are not professional witnesses. See Mark
Hansen, Everyday Heroes, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2005, at 23 (illustrating how nonprofessional witnesses are more credible than professional witnesses).
136. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, advisory committee's note (stating in reference to
subdivision (b)(4)(A) of the 1970 Amendment, "Effective cross-examination of
an expert witness requires advance preparation.... Similarly, effective
rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the other
side.").
137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1) (requiring a party to supplement or correct
the previous disclosure when that party learns that the information disclosed
is not complete); see also supra notes 18-19 (describing when a party is not
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The comprehensive exchange better serves the trial
The comprehensive exchange
preparation efficiency purpose.
includes information needed to take better-focused depositions of
all employee experts and party experts. The limited exchange
includes information needed to take better-focused depositions of
The
only a select group of employee experts and party experts.'
comprehensive exchange has the added advantage of providing
information at the right time and in the right sequence under a
for the entire expert witness
court-ordered schedule designed
139
component of trial preparation.
Whether the comprehensive exchange substantially increases
litigation cost is unclear. The comprehensive exchange is more
expensive than the limited exchange, but the comprehensive
exchange leads to more efficient trial preparation. The net change
in litigation cost is hard to determine. An empirical study of the
impact of Federal Rule 26's written report requirement suggests,
however, that the number of cases in which the comprehensive
exchange decreases litigation cost might equal the number of cases
in which the comprehensive exchange increases litigation cost. 40

under an obligation to supplement previous disclosures).
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note (discussing subdivision
(a)(2)(B) of the 1993 Amendment and stating, "Since depositions of experts
required to prepare a written report may be taken only after the report has
been served, the length of the deposition of such experts should be reduced,
and in many cases the report may eliminate the need for a deposition.").
139. Making all employee experts and party experts subject to the written
report requirement would require one adjustment in Federal Rule 26's timing
requirements. Under Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(A)'s deposition timing
requirement, a party cannot depose an expert covered by the written report
requirement until the expert's report is provided. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
This deposition timing requirement makes sense for experts who have no
involvement in the occurrence on which the suit is based, but the requirement
does not make sense for experts who have this type of involvement. Written
reports usually are exchanged as the trial date approaches - long after an
employee or party who was involved in the occurrence must be deposed in
order to uncover the facts. For the employee expert or party expert who was
involved in the occurrence, the sensible solution is to permit two nonrepetitive depositions, the second of which is limited in scope to the contents of
the written report.
140. When attorneys were surveyed a few years after the written report
requirement was added to Federal Rule 26, a slightly greater percentage of the
surveyed attorneys (31% versus 27%) reported decreased litigation expense
rather than increased litigation expense. Thomas E. Willging, Donna
Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery
and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 525, 536 (1998). The proposed Amendment covers different experts than
the 1993 Amendment, of course, so the study's conclusion about the effect of
the 1993 Amendment might not apply here.
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The Illinois Committee ultimately recommended the
comprehensive exchange - i.e., that all employee experts and party
experts should be covered by the standard interrogatory designed
for retained experts. 14' Acting on this recommendation, the Illinois
Supreme Court approved a revised interrogatory rule adopting the
comprehensive exchange feature.'
During the years the revised
rule has governed expert witness discovery in the Illinois courts,
the Illinois Committee has not received any complaints of
substantially increased litigation costs.'
Other states have also
adopted comprehensive exchanges, and litigation cost problems
have not led those states' rule-makers to return to the Federal
Rule 26 limited exchange model.'"'
2. Interpretationand Application Problems
The proposed extension of the written report requirement to
all employee experts and party experts will eliminate the
interpretation and application problems associated with Federal
Rule 26. As a result of the extension, federal courts will not have
to decide whether "specially employed" means "specially hired" or
"specially used;"'45 whether an employee expert or party expert did
work for the purpose of providing expert testimony; and whether
an employee "regularly" gives this type of testimony. Federal
courts will focus instead on a single question: Does the employee's
testimony or the party's testimony count as expert testimony

141. Witness Disclosure,supra note 124, at 253.
142. Id. at 256.
143. The author serves as the Illinois Committee's Professor-Reporter.

The

only problem brought to the Illinois Committee's attention related to the
disclosure required in advance of the evidence deposition of a treating
physician. Transcript of the 2006 Annual Public Hearing of the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules Committee, at 92-95, 107-14, & 127-32 (Jan. 24, 2006)

(statements of Steven Pietrick, Patrick Dwyer & Michael Hyman), availableat
http://legalreclamations.blogspot.com/2007/03/annual-report-of-illinoissupreme-court.html.

144. See supra notes 54 and 55 (providing a list of states adopting
comprehensive exchanges).

145. The proposed amendment does not remove the words "specially
employed" from the part of Federal Rule 26 that protects work done by nontestifying experts, so the "specially hired" versus "specially used" controversy

will remain unresolved for non-testifying
accompanying notes 62-74.

experts.

See

supra text
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under the Federal Rules of Evidence? 4" If so, a written report will
be required.
3. Expert Witness PreparationIssues
When the Advisory Committee first discussed whether to
extend the written report requirement to all employee experts,
some members of the Advisory Committee expressed concern that
this extension would cause additional waivers of the protections
given to attorney-client communications, work product, and work
done by non-testifying experts.'47 The source of these members'
concern is the obligation to include in a written report all data or
other information "considered by" the expert in forming
opinions.'
According to the Advisory Committee's note to the
1993 Amendment, this obligation means:
[LIitigants should no longer be able to argue that materials
furnished to their experts to be used in forming their opinions whether or not ultimately relied on by the expert - are privileged or
otherwise protected from149disclosure when such persons are
testifying or being deposed.
Assuming this Advisory Committee note will cause courts to
reject arguments they otherwise would have accepted, 150 the
extension of the written report requirement proposed here - to all
employee experts and party experts - will cause additional
waivers. Legal commentators rightly have urged the Advisory
Committee to recommend a Federal Rule 26 amendment that
better addresses the waiver issue.'
Attorneys deserve advance
notice of the effect of sharing documents and information with all
expert witnesses - including the employee experts and party
experts who have been excused until now from preparing written
reports. For documents and information protected as attorneyclient communications, work product, or work done by non-

146. See supra note 35 (reviewing the decisions on the related question of
whether a treating physician's testimony counts as expert testimony). If an
attorney is uncertain whether employee testimony or party testimony counts
as expert testimony rather than as lay opinion testimony, the attorney may
have to provide a written report in order to ensure admission of the employee's
or party's testimony. Advisory Committee Minutes 2005, supra note 121, at
lines 502-05. In this way, unfortunately, the attorney's uncertainty leads to
increased litigation cost.
147. Id. at lines 490-96, 506-59.
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
149. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note (evaluating
subdivision (a)(2)(B) of the 1993 Amendment).

150. As Mickum and Jajek have shown, this assumption is not necessarily
correct. Artful Dodging, supra note 56, at 361-63.

151. Id. at 360.
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testifying experts, this sharing might cause no waiver of any of
these protections, waiver of all three protections, or waiver of just
some of the protections.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") promotes the nowaiver result for the sharing of attorney work product.'52 In its
Standards For Civil Discovery, the ABA calls for rules that limit
the content of expert witness reports and protect attorney-expert
witness
communications." 3
The ABA's
report-content
recommendation is that reports contain only the data or
information that an expert witness is "relying on" in formulating
opinions."' The ABA's attorney-expert witness communications
recommendation is that communications revealing an attorney's
mental impressions, opinions, or trial strategy should be
protected."' In the ABA's judgment, the other party's need for
these communications is outweighed by the attorney's need to
exchange ideas with an expert witness; the party's legitimate
expectation about the expert's adversary role; the party's interest
in avoiding the added cost of hiring one expert for consultation and
another expert to testify; and the other attorney's ability to crossexamine the expert effectively based on everything upon which the
expert actually relied."' Separately, the ABA has urged federal
and state courts to adopt rules that prevent discovery of draft
expert witness reports, and rules that protect communications
between attorneys and expert witnesses about these draft
reports. "'
Most of the states with comprehensive expert witness
information exchange rules agree with the ABA report-content
recommendation. "' For example, the Illinois rule's standard

152. STANDARDS FOR CIVIL DISCOVERY §§ 20(a), 21(b)(iii), and 21(e) (2004),

available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civil
discoverystandards.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS].

153. The ABA Section on Litigation developed the standards. Id. The ABA
approved these Standards. Resolution of the ABA House of Delegates, Aug. 910, 2004, available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/annual/daily
journal/103B.doc.
154. CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 152, at § 21(b)(iii). Further,
the expert report should contain a description of where the data or information
can be found if it is not a part of the record or has not been produced during
discovery. Id.
155. Id. § 21(e).
156. Id. § 21(e) cmt.
157. ABA Recommendation, adopted by A.B.A. H.D. Res. 120A, at 17 (Aug.
7-8, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2006/annual/

DAILYJOURNAL.pdf.
158. The Colorado rule differs substantially from the Civil Discovery
Standards. Under the Colorado rule, the required disclosure for experts of the
types who are covered by the Federal Rule 26 written report requirement is a
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interrogatory for retained experts, employee experts, and party
experts requires a statement of the "bases" of these experts'
opinions. 9
Several other states' rules similarly require a
statement of the "grounds" for the experts' opinions16 ° or the
"general substance of the testimony."16' Data or information must
be relied on for it to be among the bases or grounds for an expert's
opinion or part of the general substance of the expert's testimony.
The courts in states that agree with the report-content
recommendation do not necessarily agree, however, with the
attorney-expert
witness
communications
recommendation.
Contrary to the ABA's recommendation, Arizona courts treat an
attorney's sharing of documents and information with an expert
witness as a waiver of the protection given to attorney work
product - and also of the protection given to work done by a
consulting expert."' Illinois courts have not yet taken a position,
but Illinois attorneys assume this sharing of information waives
the work product and consulting expert protections.'6 Similar to
the ABA recommendations, California courts permit an attorney to

Federal Rule 26-type written report or summary that includes the data or
other information "considered by" the expert. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I).
For other experts, the Colorado rule requires a simpler written report or
summary that includes only the "basis" for the expert's opinions. Id. at
26(a)(2)(B)(II). Based on the first quoted provision of the Colorado rule, the
Colorado Supreme Court has concluded that sharing material with a testifying
expert waives the protection for opinion work product. Gall ex rel. Gall v.
Jamison, 44 P.3d 233, 235-41 (Colo. 2002). The Colorado Supreme Court did
not indicate whether sharing material with an expert witness covered by the
simpler written report requirement waives this protection. Id.
159. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(f)(3).
160. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 26.1(2)(6); CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. 13-4(4); MD. R. Civ.
P. 2-402(f)(1); N.H. R. SUPER. CT. 35(f); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101(d) (Consol. 2002);
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A); VT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
161. CAL. CODE. CIV. P. §§ 2034.210(b) & 2034.260(c)(2) (West 2006).
162. In Emergency Card Dynamics, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 932 P.2d 297,
299-302 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997), the court permitted discovery of an expert
witness's entire case file, despite a claim that this file contained protected
hypotheses, mental impressions, and litigation strategies that attorneys had
explored with him as a consulting expert. The Arizona court acknowledged
that this approach can require parties in some cases to hire two experts
instead of one, but the court emphasized the state's support of free-ranging
cross-examination of experts and suggested that the added cost of hiring
separate consulting and testifying experts is probably lower cumulatively than
"the systemic costs of innumerable discovery battles over expert witness files."
Id. at 302.
163. The author bases this conclusion on discussions with several Illinois
Committee members who practice in different parts of the state. E-mails from
Mary Farmar, John Nicoara, Nicholas Motherway, Donald Peterson & Edward
Wagner to Keith Beyler (May 9, 2007) (on file with author). Of course, the
Illinois Committee takes no official position on the waiver issue.
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share documents or information with an expert witness without
waiving these protections.' 4
Texas disagrees with the report-content recommendation, and
perhaps, with the attorney-expert witness communications
recommendation, as well.'65
For any expert witness who is
retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to a party's control,
the Texas rule's expert witness disclosure includes documents,
tangible things, reports, models, or data compilations that have
been "provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by or for the expert in
anticipation of the expert's testimony."'66 Based on this quoted
provision, Texas courts have ruled that sharing documents or
information with an expert witness waives the protections
for
67
work product and work done by a consulting expert. 1
Based on the experience in Illinois, Arizona, and Texas, the
Advisory Committee should not let concern about additional work
product and consulting expert protection waivers stop it from
recommending an extension of the written report requirement to
all employee experts and party experts. If losing these two
protections crippled attorney discussions with experts, the Illinois
Committee likely would have received complaints by now, and the
Arizona and Texas rule-makers likely would have changed their
states' rules.
The no-waiver rule is, of course, workable, too. If it were not,
the California rule-makers likely would have changed their state's
rule."
In 1993, however, the Advisory Committee decided to

164. In Nat'l Steel ProductsCo. v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 535, 541-44
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985), where an expert witness had prepared a report while
acting as an expert advisor in an earlier case, the state's policy of protecting
attorney work product and work done by expert advisors required an in
camera review of this report to determine the extent to which it should be
protected from discovery. The California court concluded that the protection
given to an attorney's impressions, conclusions, and theories is not lost when
an attorney shares them with an expert who is later identified as an expert
witness; that the protection given to work done in the expert's advisory
capacity is also not lost; but that the conditional protection given to other
types of work product might be overcome by the report's impeachment value
and uniqueness. Id. at 543-44.
165. TEX. R. Civ. P. 194.2(f)(4)(A).
166. Id.
167. See In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 437-45 (Tex.
2007) (holding that there was a waiver of work product protection, even
though the material was inadvertently given to an expert, when the expert
remained designated to testify); see also Vela v. Wagner & Brown, Ltd., 203
S.W.3d 37, 57 (Tex. App. Ct. 2006) (demonstrating a waiver of protection for
work done by a consulting expert).
168. The Advisory Committee also has received information that
Massachusetts and New Jersey follow the no-waiver rule, which reportedly
works well in those states. Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, at
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require disclosure of materials shared by an attorney with
retained expert witnesses and equivalents so that an opposing
169
attorney can expose any improper expert witness preparation.
The need to share an attorney's or consulting expert's theories and
conclusions with employee experts and party experts does not
seem to be fundamentally greater than the need to share these
theories and conclusions with retained experts and equivalents,
and the risk of improper expert witness preparation seems to be
equally great. Therefore, the amendment proposed here treats
this sharing as a waiver of the work product and consulting expert
protections. 170
The Advisory Committee should make a different
recommendation, however, about the effect of expert witness
preparation
regarding the protection for attorney-client
communications. As some members of the Advisory Committee
have correctly stated, the need for attorneys to communicate with
employee experts under the shield of privilege may be
compelling. 1 ' These employees may have the facts the attorneys
need in order to give legal advice about the litigation, and the
attorneys may need to explain legal decisions to them. The need
for attorneys to communicate freely with party experts, who are
clients, is even more compelling.
Further, the Advisory Committee should treat the attorneyclient privilege differently because Congress treats privilege
objections and other objections differently.
When Congress
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress chose to defer to
state privilege law when state substantive law applies. 7' For
example, in a suit filed under diversity jurisdiction and based on
Illinois law, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence calls for the
application of the Illinois attorney-client privilege.'
Illinois uses

lines 1546-68 (May 22-23, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules
/minutes/CV05-2006-min.pdf.
169. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26, advisory committee's note (evaluating
subdivision (a)(2)(B) of the 1993 Amendment); Advisory Committee Minutes
2005, supra note 121, at lines 1569-71.
170. If the Advisory Committee disagrees, it should recommend the Colorado
approach of requiring a simpler written report for the employee experts and
party experts who have been excused until now from preparing written
reports. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. Additionally, it should

recommend a waiver provision that treats sharing with retained experts and
equivalents as a waiver but does not treat sharing with other experts as a

waiver.
171. Advisory Committee Minutes 2005, supra note 120, at lines 509-11.
172 FED. R. EVID. 501; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore, A
Treatise on Evidence: Evidentiary Privileges, § 4.2.2 (Aspen Law & Business

2002).
173. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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the control group test to identify which employees' confidential
communications with a corporation's attorney are privileged
communications. 174 The typical employee expert does not belong to
a corporation's control group, so the Illinois attorney-client
privilege often does not protect communications between a
corporation's attorney and an employee expert. 175 In a suit based
on another state's law, however, that other state's attorney-client
privilege applies and might extend beyond the control group. 176 In
a suit based on federal law, the federal attorney-client
privilege
1 78
applies 7 ' and extends beyond the control group.
Honoring these state-to-state and state/federal differences in
privilege law will not cause a significant problem. If other
attorneys can allow for these differences when developing and
providing legal advice to their corporate clients about issues of
substantive law, trial attorneys can allow for these differences in
preparing their corporate clients' employee experts for trial.
Therefore, the amendment proposed here refers courts to Rule 501
of the Federal Rules of Evidence on attorney-client privilege issues
that arise out of expert witness preparation.
The amendment proposed here
accepts the ABA
recommendation on protecting draft expert witness reports. The
ABA surely is right that requiring production of draft reports often
will lead to no draft being produced. Instead, the attorney and
expert will have detailed oral discussions followed by the
preparation of a final report with no drafts.

174. Consolidation Coal v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 257-58 (Ill.
1982).
175. See id. (discussing a non-testifying employee expert).

If a privileged

document is shown to someone outside the control group, moreover, the
privilege is lost. See Sterling Fin. Mgt., L.P. v. UBS Paine Webber, Inc., 782
N.E.2d 895, 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (concluding that under Illinois' attorney-

client privilege law, the materials at issue are not protected); MidwescoPaschen Joint Venture for Viking Projects v. IMO Indus., Inc., 638 N.E.2d 322,
329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (expanding on what documents are privileged in

attorney-client situations).

Illinois attorneys do not necessarily insist,

however, on discovery of attorney communications with employee experts who

are outside of the control group.

The attorneys referred to in note 162

indicated to the author that Illinois attorneys may respect the confidentiality
of attorney communications with employee witnesses in preparation for
deposition or trial without regard to whether an employee is part of the control
group. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
176. See Sterling Fin. Mgt., L.P., 782 N.E.2d at 901-02 (discussing New York
privilege law, though not in the expert witness preparation context).

177. FED. R. EVID. 501.
178. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-97 (1981).
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B. Independent Expert Witnesses
Independent experts - especially treating physicians - pose
the greatest problem when designing a standard exchange of
expert witness information. 79 In the opinion of many trial judges
and trial attorneys, jurors consider treating physicians to be
relatively unbiased experts whose medical opinions deserve extra
weight. For this reason, an attorney preparing either to depose or
to cross-examine a treating physician undeniably needs disclosure
of the physician's opinions. The need for disclosure increases
when the medical records do not contain the physician's opinions,
or when the injured party has seen several physicians, and the
treating physician might or might not be testifying about
causation and prognosis. The need for disclosure peaks when the
physician has an opinion that is not in the medical records and
might not be anticipated, such as the opinion in a medical
malpractice suit that the defendant physician breached the
standard of care.
While these needs favor a full disclosure requirement, the
party that calls a treating physician sometimes can get the
physician's cooperation only by paying a large consulting fee and
other times might not be able to get the physician's cooperation at
any price.' ° As a result, the party might be unable to disclose
some of the physician's opinions before the physician's deposition.
The Illinois expert witness interrogatory rule was designed for
these situations.
The Illinois rule's standard expert witness interrogatory for
independent expert witnesses requires a statement of the subjects
on which the expert will testify and the opinions the party expects
to elicit.' A party does not need to know all of the opinions held
by an independent expert in order to state the opinions it expects
to elicit, and the rule's reasonable notice standard takes into
account the limitations on a party's knowledge.'
In other words,
a party will provide a less detailed statement of opinions when an
independent expert does not cooperate, and a more detailed
statement when an independent expert does cooperate."
Since
the Illinois rule was revised in 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court

179. See Witness Disclosure, supra note 124, at 227-29, 246-47 and 250-53
(summarizing the information presented to the Illinois Committee on

disclosure problems with treating physicians).
180. See Witness Disclosure, supra note 124, at 227-29, 246-47 & 250-53

(summarizing the information presented to the Illinois Committee on
disclosure problems with treating physicians).
181. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(f)(2).

182. Id.
183. ILL. S. CT. R. 213(f) cmt.
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Rules Committee has received no reports of problems caused by
requiring the exchange of independent expert witness opinions
under a reasonable notice standard. 1
Drawing on the Illinois courts' experience, the Federal Rule
26 amendment proposed here requires that parties provide a
written statement of the opinions they expect to elicit from each of
their independent expert witnesses. This written statement will
require far less information than a written report, so courts still
will have to decide whether exceptional circumstances require
them to count a treating physician as a retained expert witness
from whom a written report is required."'5 Yet, the decision about
what exceptions to recognize, and whether the circumstances fit
an exception, will become less important. Even if no exception
applies, the party that calls a treating physician must still set
forth the opinions it expects to elicit and will have to update this
information if it later learns that an opinion has changed. The
proposed amendment's distinction between "controlled" and
"independent" expert witnesses also helps direct attention to the
proper basis for deeming a treating physician to be a retained
expert for whom a written reports is required - i.e., the
circumstances indicate that the party (or its attorney) has effective
control and can get the physician to prepare the report.
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule 26's expert testimony disclosure and expert
witness discovery procedure should be revised to provide for a
better-defined and more comprehensive standard exchange of
expert witness information. In its latest round of discussions, the
Advisory Committee appears to be moving in the direction
advocated in this Article." The Advisory Committee's discussion

184. The only controversial effect of the amendment related to the shift it
caused regarding which party pays to obtain information about a treating
physician's opinions. Witness Disclosure, supra note 123, at 262-63. The
former rule had required such detailed information that an injured party often
had to pay to depose the treating physician in order to provide this
information. Id. The amendment freed the injured party from taking these
depositions. Id. As a result, the defendant pays for more treating physician
depositions than before. Id. Of course, the Federal Rule 26 amendment
proposed here will cause no such cost shift to the defendant because Federal
Rule 26 has not required the injured party to include a treating physician's

opinions in its expert testimony disclosure. Instead, the proposed amendment
will cause plaintiffs to incur some additional cost in disclosing treating
physician opinions.
185. See supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
186. Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair of the
Subcommittee on Rule 26, to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on April
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draft, however, does not extend the written report requirement to
all employee experts and party experts.'87 The draft also fails to
clarify the special employment test, which it will continue using to
identify persons who must prepare written reports. 18 The changes
set forth in the Appendix which follows will eliminate the need to
clarify the test, and will make Federal Rule 26 in all respects a
leading-edge rule on the exchange of expert witness information.

18, 2007, Meeting on Expert Disclosure Issues, at 308 (undated), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Agenda%20Books/CV-2007-04.pdf.
187. See id. at 5-6 (requiring disclosure of subject matter, opinions, and
grounds for opinions for expert witnesses not covered by the written report
requirement).
188. Id.
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE 26
(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURES.

(2) Disclosure of Expert Testimony.
(A) In General. In addition to the disclosures required by Rule
26(a)(1), a party must disclose to the other parties the identity
of its expert witnesses. An "expert witness" is any witness it
may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, 703, or 705. A "controlled expert witness" is an
expert witness who is a party, a party's current employee, or a
party's retained expert. An "independent expert witness" is an
expert witness who is neither a party, nor a party's current
employee, nor a party's retained expert.
(B) Written Report or Written Statement. Unless otherwise
stipulated or ordered by the court, this disclosure must be
accompanied by the written reports and written statements
prepared
described in (i) and (ii) below. a written rport

and signed by the witness -if the witness is one retained or
specially employed to provde

....
xpet
.. stim

in th

ea

one whose duties as the party's emloe regularly involve
giving exprttstim
1 ony. The report must contain:
(i) Each controlled expert witness must prepare and sian a
written report containing (4) a complete statement of all
opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons
for them; (i4 the data or other information considered by
the witness in forming them; 44) any exhibits that will be
used to summarize or support them; (iv) the witness's
qualifications, including a list of all publications authored
in the previous ten years; (v4 a list of all other cases in
which, during the previous four years, the witness testified
as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (vi) a statement
of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony
in the case.
(ii) For each independent expert witness, a party must
provide a written statement of the subjects on which the
expert will testify and the opinions the party expects to
elicit. This written statement is sufficient if it gives
reasonable notice of the expert's testimony, taking into
account the limitations on the party's knowledge of the
facts known by and the opinions held by the expert.
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(E) An expert witness's consideration of data or other
information in forming opinions waives any protection of the
data or other information under Rule 26(b)(3) or Rule
26(b)(4)(B). Federal Rule of Evidence 501 determines whether
communications between an attorney and an expert witness
are privileged. The drafts of a written report required by Rule
26(a)(2)(B)(i) are discoverable only on a showing of exceptional
circumstances that make it impracticable to cross-examine the
expert effectively without the drafts.

(b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS.

(4) Trial Preparation; Experts.
(A) Expert Who May Testify. A party may depose any person
who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be
presented at trial. If the expert is a retained expert Rtle
26(a)(2)(B) r.
t r..port &
the expert, the deposition
may be conducted only after the report is provided.

(e) SUPPLEMENTING DISCLOSURES AND RESPONSES.

(2) Expert Witness. For an expert whose report must be disclosed
under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i). or for whom a written statement is
required under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii), the party's duty to
supplement extends both to information included in the report or
written statement and to information given during the expert's
deposition. Any additions or other changes to this information
must be disclosed by the time the party's pretrial disclosures
under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.

